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Pre-modern growth was to a large extent dependent on processes of commercialization and specialization, based on cheap
transport. Seminal interpretations of the process of economic growth before the Industrial Revolution have pointed to the strategic
importance of the rise of the Atlantic economy and the growth of cities linked to this, but have not really explained why Europeans
were so efﬁcient in organizing large international networks of shipping and trade. Most studies concerning early modern shipping
have focused on changes in ship design (capital investments) in explaining long-term performance of European shipping in the pre-
1800 period; in this paper we argue that this is only part of the explanation. Human capital – the quality of the labour force
employed on ships – mattered as well. We ﬁrstly demonstrate that levels of human capital on board European ships were relatively
high, and secondly that there were powerful links between the level of labour productivity in shipping and the quality of the
workforce. This suggests strongly that shipping was a ‘high tech’ industry not only employing high quality capital goods, but also,
as a complementary input, high quality labour, which was required to operate the increasingly complex ships and their equipment.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).JEL classification: J24; N34; N74
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Shipping was a key sector of the economies of Europe
before 1800. In the pre-modern period, growth was largely
dependent on processes of commercialization and special-
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3.0/).growth before the Industrial Revolution have pointed to
the importance of the rise of the Atlantic economy and the
resulting expansion of cities (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Allen,
2009; Wrigley, 1985). But such accounts have not
adequately explained why Europeans could so efficiently
organise large international networks of shipping and trade.
Concerning shipping, there is a more qualitative story toen@uu.nl (J.L. van Zanden).
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major innovations in the High Middle Ages (as a result of
the merging of Mediterranean and northern traditions of
ship design), the development of the fluyt in the sixteenth
century, and ultimately the transformative developments in
navigation and in ship construction in eighteenth-century
England (Unger, 1978; Davids, 2008; Lucassen and
Unger, 2011). We argue in this paper that these forms of
technological change only partly explain the long-term
performance of European shipping in the pre-1800 period.
The quality of the labour force employed on ships – their
human capital – was also important.
The central thesis of our paper is that not only were
such human capital levels aboard European ships
exceedingly high, but that labour productivity in shipping
was strongly linked to the quality of the workforce.
Because shipping was a ‘high tech’ industry (Rediker,
1989) not only did it employ high-quality capital goods
(increasingly efficient ships), but it also needed, as a
complementary input, high-quality labour across different
ranks, which was required to operate the increasingly
complex ships and their equipment (Lucassen and Unger,
2011). We explain in this paper that the growth and
performance of European shipping was therefore not
simply a technological trajectory representing a shifting
ratio between capital and labour. ‘Raw labour’ was
improved by both capital goods and complementary
human capital. The latter point is key for the ongoing
discussion about the role of human capital in the pre-1800
economy. Some scholars have argued that the skills of
‘common workers’ were negligible ingredients of
pre-1800 economic growth (Allen, 2009; Mokyr, 2002,
2010), but our findings concerning a major segment of
the European labour market (Van Lottum, 2007) suggest
that such skills were indeed important.
Eighteenth-century observers were quite aware of the
significance of ordinary maritime workers (i.e., not only
the officers) and their skills. In his Wealth of Nations,
Adam Smith observes that common sailors were highly
skilled when compared to their peers on land. And yet,
‘Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to that
of almost all artificers, and though their whole life is one
continual scene of hardship and danger, yet for all this
dexterity and skill […] they receive scarce any other
recompence but the pleasure of exercising the one and of
surmounting the other’ (Smith, 1778: 134–35). Although
Smith does not explicitly link seamanship (the term used
to describe a wide variety of maritime skills) to
performance in the sector, it was common knowledge in
the eighteenth century that productivity was greatly
affected by the quality of a crew. Take, for example,
what we would now call an op-ed piece from April 1791,in the magazine The Bee (Anglicus, 1791). The anony-
mous contributor ‘Anglicus’ argues that the notion that
‘one Englishmen was a match for three of the Gallic race’
(176) could in fact be proven by looking at shipping
statistics. His jingoism notwithstanding, the author makes
some pertinent observations. To prove his point he lists the
average burden of English, Swedish, Danish, French, and
Spanish ships and compares these to the average number
of men serving on board these ships – thereby creating
so-called tonnage-per-man ratios, a measure we will also
adopt in our analysis. The figures presented (177) show
that the French did indeed ‘employ three times as many
hands’ on their ships as the English – the ton-to-man ratio
turns out to be three times as low in England. Anglicus
then makes the point that this is not (or rather cannot be) a
matter of comparing different types of ships. Indeed, he
claims he has assessed comparable merchant vessels, and
the difference can solely be explained by the quality of the
crews: ‘[the] seamanship [of] one Englishman is literally,
and without exaggeration, a match for three Frenchmen’
(176).
In a recent evaluation of the skill level of maritime
workers (Van Lottum and Poulsen, 2011) it was shown for
the first time that compared to other sectors of the
economy, the maritime sector was generally characterised
by relatively high levels of human capital, thus confirming
Smith's claim in The Wealth of Nations. However, the
latter paper looked only at the human capital indicators of
numeracy and literacy for seamen according to country of
origin, and was limited to the end of the eighteenth
century. As such, it could not measure the development of
skill levels in national fleets, nor did it allow for an
analysis of the possible effect of the two indicators on
productivity. Using the same source but constructing a
new (and much larger) relational database, containing a
variety of data concerning the crews and the ships to
which they belonged for the beginning and end of the
eighteenth century, in the present paper we are for the first
time able to analyse the effect of human capital on labour
productivity in the European maritime sector.
2. The dataset
The source we use for our analysis is the so-called
Prize Paper archive (Van Lottum et al., 2011; van
Rossum et al., 2010). The archive consists of docu-
ments concerning actions by the Royal Navy taken with
regard to privateering, and is part of the extensive
archive of the High Court of Admiralty (HCA), which
can be found at The National Archives in Kew (TNA).
The section of the collection we have used for our
analysis is the court's interrogations of crewmembers of
1 The HISCO (Historical International Classiﬁcation of Occupations)
coding can be found at http://historyofwork.iisg.nl/.
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private man-of-war captured what they suspected was
an enemy ship, or if it was believed a ship carried cargo
owned by a merchant from an enemy nation, the court
needed to establish whether the vessel was in fact a
lawful prize. In reality this meant that ships from enemy
and friendly nations were brought ashore. This was
often the only way to determine the origin of the ship;
many merchant ships carried several national flags that
they could fly in order to fool an enemy (Eyck van
Heslinga, 1982). Ships were captured not only in the
waters surrounding the United Kingdom, but also near
to English interests in the Mediterranean, such as the
Canary Islands, Livorno, or Menorca. Other captures
were done as far away as the Indian Ocean, in the Bay
of Bengal, off the Cape coast and west coast of Africa.
However, most captures occurred in the English
Channel, from outside Great Yarmouth in the north to
Penzance and off the Cornish coast in the south.
Even in times of war, when privateering was themodus
operandus, the British state tried to protect property rights
not only of its own citizens but also of foreigners, and
applied strict administrative procedures to that purpose.
An essential part of the procedure was the cross-
examination of the crews, who were interrogated about
all matters relating to the ownership of the ship and its
cargo (Van Lottum et al., 2011). Although there are
instances in which the entire crew was questioned, the
interrogations usually involved three men (the average in
the dataset is 2.7 interrogations per ship): in nearly all
instances the master, sometimes an officer (such as a
mate), and usually one or two common sailors or other
ordinary crewmembers.
The interrogations were conducted during the end of
the seventeenth century, for different periods of the
eighteenth century, and at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. In this paper we will focus on two key periods,
the first just after the turn of the eighteenth century
(1702–1712) and the second several decades later
(1777–1801). The data for Period 1 pertains to ships
taken in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714);
the database contains data for 1702–1712. The second
period (Period 2) is based on ships taken in the War of the
American Revolution (1776–1783) and the French
Revolutionary Wars (1792 until 1802). Here our database
contains data for the years 1777 to 1801. As stated above,
based on the interrogations, we constructed a relational
database consisting of all relevant variables of the
merchant ships and its crews. This includes the country
of origin of the ship and its crewmembers, along with the
ship's destination, age, and information about its owner-
ship, for instance whether or not the master was its owner,in full or in part. Because the database was intended to
research various aspects of merchant shipping, all other
captured vessels, such as fishing boats, men-of-war, and
privateers, were excluded.
To facilitate a diachronic quantitative and qualitative
analysis, the data had to undergo series of standardisation
and coding rounds. All place-names in the dataset have
been standardised and geocoded and to strengthen the
robustness of our analysis country group codes have been
added to the ships' places of origin. And to help create a
meaningful comparison of the individuals' characteristics
over time, all occupations of seamen (i.e., their ranks) in
the dataset have been standardised using the widely-used
HISCO categorisation.1 Moreover, it was essential to
exclude a number of ships (and therefore seamen) from the
collected data. The data that was initially extracted from
the archive contained a very broad range of ship sizes; the
burden of the ships ranged from 2 to 1,500 tons.
Moreover, there is wide geographical variation in the
journeys undertaken by the vessels; the interrogations
cover not only ships sailing between European destina-
tions, but also between Europe and Asia, as well as many
transatlantic voyages. Although even within intra-
European trade tonnage-per-man ratios could differ – in
particular due to the length of the journey (and thus higher
mortality rates among the crew) but also the number of
canons on board – ton-per-man ratios on ships sailing to
the East and West Indies were often quite different from
those on intra-European routes (Davis, 1972; Lucassen
and Unger, 2011). Therefore, to compare like-for-like
vessels as much as possible, the dataset we use in the
present study contains data only for ships sailing on
intra-European routes and is limited to ships of 50–300
tons burden, thus excludingwhat are generally regarded as
particularly small and large ships (Davis, 1972: 78–80).
The data for the beginning of the eighteenth century
(Period 1) consists of a relatively large group of small
vessels. Between Period 1 and 2, however, ship size
increased substantially. Fig. 1, which shows kernel
density plots for the two periods in the dataset,
demonstrates that during the eighteenth century, many
of the smaller ships were replaced by bigger ones. As a
result, in Period 2 the distribution of ship sizes becomes
more evenly spread.
The shift in scale size is confirmed by the descriptive
statistics of the two periods. Table 1 reveals that in
Period 1 the mean was 102 tons, with a median of 80.
During the eighteenth century the mean ship size rose to
133 tons, while the median increased to 120 tons. The
Note: Bandwidth Period 1=11.828; Period 2=12.160
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Fig. 1. Kernel density plot of the ships in Period 1 (1702–1712) and Period 2 (1777–1801).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the ships in Period 1 (1702–1712) and Period
2 (1777–1801).
Period 1 Period 2
N Mean Median N Mean Median
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ences with regard to size. In our dataset the ships from
the countries north of France were larger than their
southern counterparts. In Period 1 the mean ship size in
the north was 108 tons, with a median of 80; in the
south the mean size was 93 tons, with 70 tons as the
median. In both regions the size of the ships increased
substantially over the eighteenth century – though with
a greater increase in ship size in the north. The northern
ships in Period 2 averaged a tonnage of 138 (median:
124); in the south the average was 110 tons (with a
median of 90 tons).
The Prize Paper archive covers all parts of the world,
and in addition to European ships includes many North
American vessels (in particular from New England).
However, because of the two criteria mentioned above,
the dataset used in this study consists exclusively of
European ships, mostly from northwestern Europe and
France.2 Fig. 2 shows the ships' places of origin.
A striking feature of the map is that English (or
British) ships feature in our dataset – they were captors,
after all, not captives. But these ships show up here
because of the common practise of interrogating the
crews of English vessels that had been captured by
privateers and subsequently recaptured by the English.
This was done to corroborate what the captured2 The few American ships sailing on intra-European routes have
been excluded from the dataset.privateers had told them and to investigate whether
other crew members had been in league with the
privateers.
Because the sample size of the various fleets (and
hence their crews) differed, in the analysis we use
(clustered) country groups (see Table 2). This makes a
more geographically balanced comparison possible and
increases the robustness of the data analysis. Ships
from the Netherlands and the Southern (or Habsburg)
Netherlands are clustered into a group aptly called ‘The
Netherlands’; the country group of ‘Scandinavia’ com-
prises ships from Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and
Finland; English, Scottish, and Irish ships are clustered
in a group called the ‘British Isles’, and all German states
and cities are grouped into the country group ‘Germany’.
Northern Europe thus refers to all countries north of the
Southern Netherlands; southern Europe consists of
France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Because they provideNorthern Europe 275 108 80 1,779 138 124
Southern Europe 184 93 70 339 110 90
All 459 102 80 2,118 133 120
Fig. 2. Origins of ships in the dataset.
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not part of any of the country groups.
3. Representativeness of the data
We believe that the interrogations provide relatively
accurate information about the ships. First, as those
questioned were likely aware, answers given in the
interrogations could be verified with relative ease by the
court. Because all the ship's papers had been confiscated(if not thrown overboard before or during the capture), the
High Court of Admiralty (or the local Vice Admiralty
Court) could corroborate what was said in the interroga-
tions; that they kept the documents makes their frequent
use in court all the more likely. The answers given by
those questioned, in fact, usually corresponds with the
information in the documents – but with enough minor
differences to suggest that there was still some room for
personal interpretation. The answers were not dictated by
the court: they frequently varied among those on board a
Table 2
Total number of crews (including officers) and ships in Period 1 (1702–1712) and Period 2 (1777–1801).
Period 1 Period 2 Total database
N ships N Crews N ships N Crews N ships N Crews
British Isles 24 47 231 370 255 417
France 160 347 233 538 393 885
Germany 32 122 761 2,180 793 2,302
The Netherlands 75 250 284 813 359 1,063
Scandinavia 144 560 503 1,447 647 2,007
Northern Europe 275 979 1,779 4,810 2,054 5,789
Southern Europe 184 415 339 764 523 1,179
Total 459 1,394 2,118 5,574 2,577 6,968
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different, depending on whether it was cited by the master
or by the crew; a sailor accounting for the ship's origin or
destination tended to be less precise than a mate when
asked the same question. Variations in responses are also
likely to have resulted from measures taken to discourage
‘cooked-up’ answers. As stated outright in the preambles
of some of the interrogations, mariners were questioned
one at a time and were kept apart from each other before
they appeared in front of the court.
A second, related issue is whether the captured ships
constitute a representative cross-section of the maritime
sector. Again, we think there is no evidence to suggest
the contrary. First, our labour productivity figures fit in
quite well with earlier estimates made by Lucassen and
Unger, who used different sources (2000, 2011).
Nevertheless, it is still possible that a section of the
ships in our dataset may not be completely representa-
tive of the sector at large. For instance, over the course
of a war the characteristics of the ships and the number
of men aboard may have changed, resulting from
(among other reasons) ship owners reacting to the
increased threat of privateering. Owners could increase
the number of guns on board, or introduce or expand the
practise of convoying; such measures could affect
productivity and make ships caught sometime after a
war's beginning potentially less representative of the
sector in peacetime. To establish whether such bias
existed in the sample, we have compared labour
productivity levels (measured here as tons per man) of
all the ships that were taken during the first and the last
year of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792–1802).
The latter period is the only span of time large enough
to fruitfully compare two individual years. This exercise
showed hardly any difference in labour productivity
levels between ships captured at the war's beginning
war and those taken near its end. In both years labour
productivity remained fairly stable and did not differ
very much from the overall average. In northern Europethe average labour productivity during this war was
16.8 tons per man; during the first year the average
labour productivity was 18.5 (based on a total of 55
ships), in the last year the ratio was 18.0 (179 ships). In
the south the differences are also marginal. In the first
year of the French Revolutionary Wars labour produc-
tivity was 13.4 tons per man (based on 21 ships), in the
last year 14.3 (36 ships); the average labour productiv-
ity for the ships from southern Europe during the entire
war was 13.7.
Finally, it is also important to discuss the representa-
tiveness of the crews' characteristics. If in particular the
more skilled sailors were interrogated, our dataset would
show an upward bias with regard to skill. Here, though,
one could argue that there may have been incentives for the
court and captain to put forth the most highly skilled
workers for questioning. After all, they were ‘sworn and
examined upon such interrogations as shall lead to the
discovery of the truth concerning the interest or property’
(Starkey, 1990: 25). But the question remains whether
court and captain actually reasoned or acted this way. The
truth is that we simply do not know the precise particulars
of the nomination procedure. There is, however, an indirect
way of testing whether such a ‘preferential interrogation’ of
sailors existed. We have compared the characteristics of
common sailors of two groups. The first group comprises
sailors interrogated in cases when only one interrogation
took place; the second encompasses those involved in
multiple-interrogation inquiries, i.e., those cases where two
or more sailors were questioned. If a selection was being
made on the basis of ‘skills’, the court or the master would
have picked the most skilled or experienced sailor aboard
in cases where only one common seamanwas interrogated.
The skill level of the group of singles would likely
be higher than that of the men involved in multiple
interrogations. We adopted two measures to approximate
the perceived skill levels of the sailor in the eyes of the
master and the court: average literacy levels and age.
Literacy levels are perhaps one of the most ‘recognizable’
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3 For various approaches to measuring productivity in shipping, see
the contributions in the edited volume by Unger (2011).
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a skill that can be analysed using our dataset. The average
age of a group is another useful indicator. Although the
master of the ship may not directly equate skill with age (as
he will have known the men aboard relatively well), it is
likely that the court, if they indeed made the selection and
wanted to interrogate the more skilled workers, would
show a preference for interrogating older (i.e., experienced)
seamen. If there was a deliberate selection of men to be
questioned, the group of single interrogates is likely to have
a higher average age.
Our comparison of the two groups based on both
literacy and age provides no evidence that our data
contains a bias towards skilled workers; indeed, there is
no indication that only ‘elite’ crewmembers were
selected or nominated for questioning. The group of
single-sailor interrogations (which was relatively small,
N: 57) had an average literacy rate of 51%, whereas the
group of multiple-sailor interrogations was even higher:
63% (N: 653). If the court or ship's master had in fact
made a deliberate selection, the former would likely
have been substantially higher. The differences in
average age levels between the ‘singles’ and ‘multiples’
group also contradict a selection bias in the sailors'
interrogations. The small group of ‘singles’ had an
average age of 26.2, but the other group even averages
slightly higher at 29.0. Again, the former group would
likely have had a (significantly) higher age than the
latter if the court had picked the more experienced,
older common sailors.4. Labour productivity
A number of studies have documented the produc-
tivity growth in European shipping in the early modern
period. Some have focused on the changes in freight
rates as an index of productivity change (North, 1958;
Harley, 1988; Van Zanden and Van Tielhof, 2009),
whereas others have concentrated, as we have, on the
tonnage-per-man ratio (Davis, 1972; Van Lottum and
Lucassen, 2007; Lucassen and Unger, 2000, 2011).3 As
pointed out by Lucassen and Unger (2011), this method
has its drawbacks. For instance, it obscures regional
variation within national markets, accounts for the
burden of the ship rather than the cargo transported, and
fails to capture more general gains in productivity such
as increases in average speed. Moreover, it is a partial
index of productivity, relating only to labour produc-
tivity, and it may therefore show different patterns of
change compared to (for example) deflated freight rates,
which is a more comprehensive measure of total factor
productivity (Van Zanden and Van Tielhof, 2009).
Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted to be an
acceptable proxy for long-term changes in labour
productivity in aggregate (Lucassen and Unger, 2011).
In their analysis of labour productivity, Lucassen and
Unger (2011) demonstrated that during the early
modern period ocean shipping underwent a profound
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periods, shown in Fig. 3, shows a similar development.
In Fig. 3, labour productivity is shown for three tonnage
classes. The division in tonnage is important because
we use average labour productivity levels in our
regression analysis in Section 7. Therefore it is essential
to establish whether labour productivity increased
across all ship sizes. As the mix of larger and smaller
ships differed between countries, growth in average
labour productivity in a national fleet or within a
country group could theoretically result from crews on
particular ships (larger ones, for instance) becoming
more efficient, while productivity on other ships fell.
First of all, Fig. 3 makes clear that there are apparent
economies of scale regarding the ships of nearly all
countries. Productivity increases quite consistently with
ship size, in particular during the later period. The
efficiency increase is shown to be linear in almost all
countries, with an increase in the ratio of about 5 between
the different tonnage classes. Moreover, the graph
demonstrates that labour productivity did in fact undergo
sizeable increases across all tonnage classes. Finally, the
graph emphasises that there were consistent differences in
productivity levels between the different country groups.
In both periods, ships from the Netherlands have the
highest labour productivity in all tonnage classes (except
one), and also have the highest average labour productiv-
ity in Period 1 (a ratio of 17) and Period 2 (21 ton per
man). They are, however, followed relatively closely by
the German vessels (Period 1: an average ratio of 16;
period 2: 20). Scandinavian ships (on average 13 tons per
man in Period 1; 16 in Period 2) and the ships fromBritish
Isles follow at some distance in Period 1, but the latter
catch up strongly in the intermediate period (the average
ratio grows from 9 to 18). Finally, the vessels from
France, the only southern European country in the graph,
lag behind the others, both at the beginning and the end of
the century (in Period 1, an average ratio of 7; in Period 2,
15 tons per man).4
In sum, Fig. 3 reveals that throughout the eighteenth
century productivity increased in all size classes. What
caused these efficiency gains? Lucassen and Unger
(2011) mention three broad categories to account for
such productivity growth: institutional change on land
and at sea; economies of scale; and technological
improvements in the design and construction (including4 The labour productivity ﬁgures furthermore show that ‘Anglicus’
seems to be somewhat overstating English performance (although our
ﬁgure is based on ships from the British Isles; i.e., Scottish and Irish
ships are included), but he certainly understated that of the French
(though they are indeed the worst performers).the way that ships were handled). They acknowledge,
too, the potential importance of the knowledge and
skills of crews, particularly in relation to advances in
technology and scale, but they emphasise the difficulty
of assessing improvements in human capital and its link
to productivity gains. Elucidating the latter – i.e.,
measuring the improvement in the human capital of
crews, as well as developing a further understanding of
the link between skill and productivity – is what we will
focus on in the remainder of this essay.
5. Human capital levels
Most eighteenth-century descriptions of sailors and
their colleagues on board deep-sea vessels were far
from flattering, although the status or perception of
seamen could differ for the various branches of
maritime employment. For instance, sailors serving on
men-of-war, large East India vessels, and whalers had
much worse reputations than that of sailors on board
merchant marine vessels (Bruijn and Lucassen, 1980;
Dana, 1946). But without a doubt seamen in general had
an ‘image problem’. Take this anonymous barb from the
Connoisseur in 1755: ‘That our ordinary seamen, who
are, many of them draughted from the very lowest of the
populace, should be thus uncivilized, is no wonder […]
but surely there ought to be as much difference in the
behaviour of the commander and his crew, as there is in
their situation’ (Connoisseur, 1755, 97).
To some extent this particular image of ‘Jack Tar’
still persists in scholarly and literary works. The seaman
in general, and the common sailor in particular, is often
described as a man drawn from the lowest classes of
society, particularly (in)famous for drinking and other
social activities (Davis, 1972). He may not be quite the
‘scum of the earth’ but he is certainly not singled out for
his self-discipline or skills. Recent scholars have done
much to add nuance to this predominantly negative and
one-dimensional image. For instance, Rediker (1989)
and, more recently, Van den Heuvel and Van der
Heijden (2007), De Wit (2009), and Bruijn (2011) have
highlighted the seaman's role as a collective worker and
wage labourer and have emphasised sailors' central role
in their families and communities. Still, in most studies
sailors are not considered particularly well trained or
skilled compared to workers in other occupations. In
this section we will reassess their skill level by an
analysis of the numeracy and literacy levels of maritime
workers compared to those in other occupational groups
and the population at large.
We estimate numeracy levels by calculating levels of
age heaping. The latter is defined as the effect of the
Table 3
Signed literacy levels of non-officers ranks aboard merchant ships
sailing on intra-European routes in Period 1 (1702–1716) and Period 2
(1777–1801).
Period 1
(1702–1716)
Period 2
(1777–1801)
Literacy rate N Literacy rate N
British Isles 70% 23 69% 124
France 55% 73 42% 233
Germany 78% 45 71% 668
The Netherlands 59% 114 76% 258
Scandinavia 58% 274 62% 439
Northern Europe 61% 456 69% 1,489
Southern Europe 58% 106 55% 323
Table 4
ABCC index of numeracy of non-officers ranks aboard merchant
ships sailing on intra-European routes in Period 1 (1702–1716) and
Period 2 (1777–1801).
Period 1
(1702–1716)
Period 2
(1777–1801)
ABCC N ABCC N
British Isles - - 97% 53
France 82% 58 85% 107
Germany - - 97% 549
The Netherlands 90% 89 96% 184
Scandinavia 85% 224 96% 346
Northern Europe 88% 362 97% 1,132
Southern Europe 83% 69 90% 155
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including) 23-year-olds and 72-year-olds (De Moor
and Van Zanden, 2010). If within this cohort a more
than average tendency exists to report ages divisible
with 5 and 10 (i.e., 25-, 30-, 35-year-olds and so on) it is
sign that the individuals in the group do not know their
exact age, which in turn is a reflection of a low level of
numeracy. The level of age heaping is commonly
expressed by the so-called Whipple index, which
measures the level at which age groups ending on 5
and 0 are overrepresented in a population group.5 In this
study we adopt the alternative Whipple or ABCC Index
which reports the share of individuals within a group
who ‘correctly’ report their age (A'Hearn et al., 2009).6
Literacy levels will be estimated by calculating the
share of people who were able to sign the interrogation.
It is important to stress that these approaches to
measuring numeracy and literacy only pick up a
minimum investment in both aspects of an individual's
(or a group's) human capital. The two proxies make it
possible to distinguish the unschooled (or barely
schooled) from those that received a form of schooling
or training that resulted in basic numeracy and/or
literacy skills, but they do not allow us to distinguish the
higher echelons of knowledge accumulation. In other
words, the method makes it impossible to distinguish
between, say, a group of office clerks and one of
university professors. Nevertheless, as both measures5 The Whipple index gives scores ranging from 0 if the ages ending
on 5 and 0 are not represented at all, and up to 500 if all ages
mentioned end with 5 or 0. A Whipple index (W) of 100 or lower
means that there is no sign of age heaping among these age groups:
W ¼ ∑ n25 þ n30 þ…þ n65 þ n70ð Þ
1
5∑
72
i¼23ni
 100.
6 ABCC ¼ 1− W−100ð Þ400
n o
 100 if W ≥ 100; else ABCC = 100.allow the detection of some degree of schooling and
skill level, they are very useful to assess the skill level
of common workers.
The literacy levels of common crews derived from
our dataset are presented in Table 3. The combined
literacy levels for crewmembers in northern and
southern Europe very much show a divergent develop-
ment between north and south. Moreover, the develop-
ment of literacy in the country groups make clear that
on a more disaggregated level, literacy in northern
European fleets developed quite differently. In Period 1,
the common crews aboard British and German ships
have the highest literacy rates of all country groups,
with levels of 70% and 78%, respectively; the crews on
other fleets had levels below 60%. During the
eighteenth century this picture changes substantially.
Literacy levels of crewmembers on board British and
Scandinavian ships increase slightly. On German and in
particular French ships there is a significant drop in
literacy levels, the latter of no fewer than 13 percentage
points. In fact, only one country group shows a strong
increase: the Netherlands. Its growth in the literacy rate
of 17 percent points is by far the largest change between
periods 1 and 2.
When we turn to the numeracy data in Table 4, we
find that numeracy levels of ordinary crewmembers
have a much more consistent development over time.
Unfortunately, the sample size of the crewmembers
aboard the British and German ships is not large enough
to allow for the calculation of age heaping levels for
Period 1. However, the estimates for the remaining
country groups (and the combined groups in the bottom
two columns) show that numeracy levels increased
across all European fleets. Indeed, common crews in
northern Europe all reach a level of about 96–97% in
Period 2. Numeracy levels of French crewmembers also
increase, though somewhat more moderately, from 82%
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crewmembers show that, as in the case of literacy
levels, overall numeracy in northern Europe was higher
than in the south.
So how do the levels of literacy and numeracy in the
dataset compare to those of the populations of the
countries involved? Comparisons between our Period 2
data and literacy rates of average populations in 1800
(based on Allen, 2003: Table 2, 415) show that indeed,
seamen had relatively high literacy levels compared to
the populations from which they came. The 53%
average literacy rate in England in 1800, for instance,
is much lower than the 69% literacy rates of common
crews aboard ships from the British Isles in Period 2
(see Table 3). And even if the literacy level of French
crews in Period 2 was lower than at the beginning of the
eighteenth century, the 42% in Period 2 was still higher
than the 35% of the average population in 1800. A
much larger skill gap existed in Germany: here the
sailors had substantially higher literacy levels than the
average population: 71% versus 35%. It is likely,
however, that part of the difference can be explained by
regional variation, for instance between coastal and
inland regions. Finally, literacy rates aboard Dutch vessels
were also higher than average, though the gap was smaller
than in the German countries. In Period 2 common seamen
aboard Dutch ships had a literacy rate of 76%, compared to
68% for the overall population in 1800. A similar pattern
emerges when we compare our numeracy estimates with
available studies of other occupational and social groups;
we see that the lower-ranked crews aboard the European
merchant ships have above-average numeracy levels.
Unskilled labourers in Denmark around 1800 show a
numeracy rate of 90%, while Danish sailors (which
includes men involved in all types of shipping) at that
time were at 88% (Van Lottum and Poulsen, 2011). The
numeracy levels of sailors aboard the Scandinavian
merchant vessels were much higher: 96%. Numeracy
estimates for burghers in eighteenth-century Amsterdam,
who were relatively well educated (certainly better than the
average for the entire population), come in at around 97%,Table 5
ABCC and literacy rate for non-officers ranks aboard the 25% least and 2
(1777–1801).
Northern Europe
Numeracy Literacy
Labour productivity ABCC N Literacy rate
Lower 25% 94% 269 75%
Upper 25% 99% 302 77%
Difference +5% +2%about the same level as the common crewmembers aboard
Dutch ships in Period 2 (DeMoor and Van Zanden, 2010).
6. Linking human capital and labour productivity
We have seen that the shipping industry was character-
ized by high levels of human capital and rapid productivity
growth. Can we establish a causal relationship between
these two features? A relatively straightforward way of
finding our whether a relationship between skills and
productivity exists is to compare the human capital levels
of crewmembers aboard high- and low-performance ships.
Such a comparison is given in Table 5, where the
human-capital level of common crews (the non-officer
ranks) are shown for the upper and lower productivity
quartile – i.e., the first and last 25% when ranking ships by
labour productivity. Unfortunately, such an analysis is not
possible for Period 1: the sample size of separate quartiles
is too small to allow for a meaningful analysis.
Table 5 shows that in both regions performance levels
do indeed correlate with human capital levels: numeracy
and literacy levels were substantially higher aboard the
most productive ships. It also shows that the difference
between the upper and lower quartile in northern Europe is
substantially smaller than in the South – though, as we
have seen above, the northern European human capital
levels were already at a much higher level.
As Section 5 showed there were economies of scale in
early modern shipping, i.e., smaller ships tended to be less
productive than large ones – one must take an additional
step to determine whether Table 5 does not simply reflect a
correlation between human capital levels and ship size.
Therefore, Fig. 4 shows the human capital and labour
productivity levels for each of the three tonnage classes
introduced in Section 5. As the sample size for southern
Europe was too small to be split up into the three tonnage
classes, we can only look at northern Europe in Period 2
(the sample size for northern Europe in Period 1 was also
too small for such an analysis). In the table we again look at
the upper and lower 25% of the ships when ranked by
labour productivity.5% most productive ships, Northern and Southern Europe, Period 2
Southern Europe
Numeracy Literacy
N ABCC N Literacy rate N
381 76% 48 45% 98
369 91% 41 56% 70
+15% +11%
Notes: 50-100 tons: ABCC lower 25%, N: 122; upper 25%, N: 94; Literacy lower 25%, N: 139; upper 
25%, N: 133. 101-200 tons: N: 146/137; 175/166). 201-300 tons: N: 47/50; 58/61.
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Fig. 4. ABCC and literacy rate for the 25% least and 25% most productive ships by tonnage class, Northern Europe, Period 2 (1777–1801).
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table: the most productive ships carry the crews with the
highest human capital levels. The only exception can be
found in the highest tonnage class. Moreover, Fig. 4 also
makes clear that there is some evidence (without testing for
its significance) to link ship size and human capital levels.
Aboard ships in the upper quartile, numeracy levels
increase in all instances; literacy levels increase only
between the first two tonnage groups. However, the
variation in the difference between the three classes
shows that ship size does not drive the overall difference
aboard the most productive ships as they were shown in
Table 5. With regard to numeracy in both the smallest and
the largest tonnage classes common crews have a
substantially higher level of human capital; in the case of
literacy this applies to the first two tonnage classes.
Let us now turn to a more a more rigorous quantitative
analysis of the dataset in a regression analysis that aims to
explain the variation in the tonnage-per-man ratio. Several
possible explanatory independent variables can be intro-
duced, most related to human capital. Nevertheless, the
dataset also allows for the effects of other relevant factors
to be tested. For instance, the source also gives information
about a ship's age, which may provide information
regarding the level of technology. The dataset also contains
information about a vessel's ownership; more specifically,
whether the captain was co-owner of the ship. Fortunately,we have this information available for nearly all ships in
the dataset (2,532 of the 2,577 ships). By including in the
analysis what we call the mastowner dummy, which is set
at 1 when the captain owns part or all of the ship, we can
test for potential agency problems that might result from
the captain's playing a central role in hiring. Crucially, in
most cases the master decided how many sailors needed to
be employed. If a captain was not an owner, his income
was not directly related to setting these costs, as he received
only a wage income. However, if the captain was an
owner, he would have had an incentive not to hire too
many sailors, which might diminish his income from the
ship. A positive effect of this variable on labour
productivity would mean that there was in fact an agency
problem and it exerted an impact on labour productivity.
There is also a potential effect of the variable related to the
skill levels among the crew. If the master chooses to
economise with regard to crew size, the incentive to hire
skilled workers becomes more important. After all, a
captain would not willingly jeopardise the success of an
enterprise in which he has a stake, and would therefore be
likely to seek out the best men possible. Table 6 shows the
distribution of this variable over the country groups and
periods; about one in three ships was co-owned by the
master.
As our primary goal is to determine whether a link
existed between human capital and labour productivity,
Table 7
Explaining the log of tonnage per man of merchant ships sailing on
intra-European routes in 1702–1716 and 1777–1801.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Mastowner .047
(1.23)
.064
(1.67)
.056
(1.47)
.022
(0.76)
.043
(1.17)
.065
(3.31)
.035
(1.96)
Litmaster .134
(9.14)
.099
(5.19)
.081
(3.84)
.092
(9.75)
.085
(13.09)
.142
(5.85)
.098
(4.43)
Numcrew .32
(7.05)
Numall .450
(11.67)
Litcrew .359
(4.10)
Litall .343
(3.61)
Litcrewship .066
(2.90)
.014
(0.62)
Period .487
(3.51)
.282
(1.79)
.187
(1.46)
.392
(2.44)
.324
(1.98)
.428
(15.7)
.366
(14.4)
Country
dummies
No No No No No No Yes
R2 .24 .30 .32 .35 .32 .21 .35
N 2048 1956 1982 2048 2048 1899 1899
Notes: T-values in parentheses. The coefficients are standardized (see the
descriptive statistics in the Appendix A). In regressions (I)–(V) the
standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial
correlation in the un-observables. In regressions (VI)–(VII) the standard
errors are clustered at the ship level. Regression (VII) includes
country-specific dummies to allow for country fixed effects.
Table 6
Master-ownership of merchant ships sailing on intra-European routes
in Period 1 (1702–1716) and Period 2 (1777–1801).
Period 1 (1702–1716) Period 2 (1777–1801)
British Isles 43% 23%
France 33% 26%
Germany 47% 37%
The Netherlands 9% 30%
Scandinavia 36% 14%
Northern Europe 31% 28%
Southern Europe 34% 29%
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capital indicators discussed in Section 6. We can employ
the following variables: ship-specific estimates of the
literacy of the master of the ship (Litmaster) and of the
crew (Litcrewship); the per-country group average literacy
of the crew (Litcrew), masters and officers excluded, and of
officers and crew (Litall); and the per-country group
average numeracy of the crew (Numcrew) and of officers
and crew (Numall). Numeracy estimates per ship are not
available: because one needs a large sample of people to
get more or less reliable estimates of the degree of age
heaping, it is impossible to get a numeracy index of every
single ship. The variables reflecting human capital range
from zero to one; the numeracy variable is, as explained,
the ABCC index. Litmaster and Litcrewship are only
weakly correlated with the other human capital variables,
but the four others (Litall, Litcrew, Numcrew, and Numall)
are all strongly correlated (.7 or higher) and therefore enter
the regressions separately (see the correlation matrix in the
Appendix A). Finally, to further test for productivity
growth over time we included a Period dummy, set at 1 for
Period 2 (1777–1801).
The distinction between literacy by ship and by
country group allows us to test two related hypotheses,
one ‘hard’ and the other ‘soft’. The ‘hard’ hypothesis
about the effect of human capital on labour productivity
is that the design of the individual ship – and therefore
the labour required to manage it – is related to the skill
level of the crew and/or the officers. For this to hold, we
have to demonstrate a link between labour productivity
and skills at the level of the individual ship. The
‘weaker’ version of the hypothesis maintains that this
link exists at the country level: the design of ships in
country A is different – making possible a higher level
of labour productivity – than the design of ships in
country B, because it reflects the higher skill level of the
labour force of country A. In this latter hypothesis, we
expect a relationship between labour productivity and
Litall and Litcrew, but not necessarily with Litcrewship.The dataset we use in the regression analysis is the same
as has been used in the previous sections. The logarithm of
the tonnage-per-man ratio is used in the regressions to
ensure that extreme values do not play a disproportionate
role. In addition, all independent variables have been
standardized to make it easier to interpret the coefficients
found. Asmentioned above, the age of the ship was used in
the regressions as a control variable, but its coefficient was
always very close to zero (and insignificant); we therefore
do not report these results. The equation including
Mastowner, Litmaster, and Period serves as a baseline
model, to which we add the human capital variables
separately to avoid collinearity issues (see the correlation
matrix in the Appendix A). The results of the regressions
are presented in Table 7. Equations (I)–(V) report on the
outcomes of the ‘weaker’ hypothesis about the effect of
human capital on labour productivity, whereas (VI)–(VII)
report on those of the ‘hard’ hypothesis. We could add
country dummies only in regression VII, as they correlated
too strongly with the country-specific levels of literacy and
numeracy in specifications (II)–(V).
The results in Table 7 show a strong and consistent
effect of the various country-specific measures of human
capital on labour productivity; as regressions (II) to (V)
7 The description of ranks is based on Q8Davis, 1972; Rediker, 1989;
Falconer, 1784; Dana, 1863; Boulet and Couwenberg, 1857.
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positive effect on tonnage per sailor. We therefore find
strong confirmation of the ‘weak’ hypothesis. At the level
of the individual ship – testing the ‘hard’ hypothesis – the
results are more mixed: the literacy of the master shows a
consistent positive coefficient in all regressions (but almost
all masters are literate), but if country dummies are
included the literacy of the ships' crews no longer affects
labour productivity. The regression analysis also shows
that it is difficult to disentangle which of the two human
capital indicators had the largest effect. Although the
development of literacy rates was somewhat more dynamic
over time, Table 7 shows that overall literacy and
numeracy were almost equally important for labour
productivity. This is not surprising given the strong
correlation between the two measures. Another consistent
result, which is plausible given the descriptive statistics in
Section 5, is that there is a significant increase in labour
productivity in the second period. Finally, the analysis also
shows that the captain's full or partial ownership of the ship
was positively related with labour productivity, but only in
one case (VI) do we find a significant effect.
7. Explaining the link between human capital
and performance
Now we have established that our data shows a link
between human capital and labour productivity, how dowe
explain this connection? We believe that much of this
relation is related to the working environment. The fact that
ocean- or sea-going ships were relatively sophisticated
pieces of technology, and therefore required a skilled
labour force, is the core issue, though in itself this is not a
sufficient explanation. After all, sophisticated machineries
do not necessarily require much education or training
among common workers; in the industrial era a limited
number of engineers combined with a massive unskilled
labour forcewere able to fully utilise relatively complicated
technology. It is our contention, however, that the
early modern maritime sector did require an all-round
skilled crew. To some degree this was already true aboard
seventeenth-centurymerchant vessels, but in the eighteenth
century a combination of technological change and – often
as a result thereof – a reduction of crew sizes led to ‘crews
[needing] to learn more and […] work harder’ (Rediker,
1989: 121). Indeed, the extra effort and level of seamanship
aboard the common merchant vessels applied not only to
officers but also to those ‘before the mast’. Only with the
expansion of officers' schools in the nineteenth century
and the introduction of steam engines did the distinction
between officers and common workers become more
pronounced on board the common merchant vessel(Rediker, 1989: 87–88). On board pre-industrial merchant
vessels, however, crucial maritime knowledge was not
limited to officers.
So what were the tasks on board merchant ships, and
what skills were required? Although differences existed
between ships of different sizes and routes, on most ships
there was a more or less uniform division of labour. On top
of the pyramid stood the master or commander: usually
appointed by a merchant, he was responsible for all matters
relating to cargo and sailors. His key task was navigation,
however, which during the course of the eighteenth century
involved instruments and mathematical calculations of
increasing complexity (Davids, 2008). While on shore the
master was also in charge of all business transactions. The
second man on board was the mate or chief mate
(sometimes, depending on the country, called the steers-
man or lieutenant), who was in charge of the daily
management of the ship, including the managing of the
crew. He also had to possess knowledge of navigation and
often drafted entries for the logbook. Should the master
perish during a voyage, it was customary for the mate to
succeed him. The boatswain (or ‘bosun’) was the senior
crewmember (i.e., of the non-officer class) on board, and
functioned as a foreman for the crew and craftsmen, and as
an intermediary between the officers and the crew. His
other tasks involved the maintenance of the ship, in
particular the rigging and sails, and the supervision of the
stores. Finally, though many of his tasks were repetitive
and required brute physical strength, the common sailor
was far from unskilled. Sailors, in the common saying, had
to ‘hand, reef and steer’ – and to ‘steer’ meant they had to
understand the functioning of a compass. Common sailors
were often divided in two categories: able bodied and
ordinary sailors, the first being more skilled (and/or
experienced) than the latter. Able bodied sailors aboard
merchant vessels were, for instance, expected to be expert
helmsmen.7
This short sketch of themost important ranks on board a
merchant vessel shows the need for a variety of skills,
which can be linked to our measures of literacy and/or
numeracy as shown in Section 6. Navigation involved
relatively advanced arithmetic; bookkeeping and main-
taining the logbook presupposed a degree of numeracy and
literacy. But also the tasks of the non-officer ranks
(boatswain and below) increasingly required more than
just physical strength and involved a deeper knowledge of
various aspects of seamanship, including navigation.
Although literacy was necessary to study the more
mathematical aspects of seamanship (which also explains
8 TNA HCA 32/689.
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literacy) many sailors would have developed relatively
good numeracy skills, as is confirmed by the figures
presented in Section 6. Indeed, as Rediker (1989: 95)
explains, the lower ranks often had a very good
understanding of the intricate functioning of a ship, and
when the wrong orders were given by the officers,
common sailors ‘were usually able to counteract such
danger through their own knowledge of the labor process’.
Centralised knowledge of the ship and its navigation was
not yet the sole privilege of the officer class, as it would
become in the latter part of the following century.
Not having the right skills had serious consequences,
and it was considered a deliberate act of deception to
pretend to have certain skills, and for instance muster as an
able bodied sailor without having the necessary experience.
During his stint on board an American merchant vessel in
the 1830s, Richard Henry Dana, Jr., observed the effect of
a common sailor not having the right skills: “If, for
instance, the articles provide for six able seamen, and if one
of the six turns out not to be a seaman [this] makes her [i.e.,
the ship] short-handed for the voyage. […] if the delinquent
was not a capable helmsmen, the increased duty at the
wheel alone would be, of itself, a serious evil” (1946: 159).
In sum, a lack of skilled workers could not only diminish
productivity, since often specialised tasks had to be
performed by fewer men, it could even lead to danger,
particularly when there were fewer men to assign to
steering (an around-the-clock task): the shortage inevitably
led to longer, or more, turns at the helm for every man. The
falling tonnage-to-man ratio on board merchant marine
vessels made skill level more important: with the reduction
of crew sizes all functions became more specialised, and
crews were under greater pressure to perform. The latter
observation tallies with the outcome of the regression
analysis: master-owners tended to be in charge of the more
productive ships, but these men would have been mindful
of the risks of taking fewer men on a journey.
A further issue to be addressed is the individual's
process of human capital acquisition. The most obvious
explanation of the relatively high human capital invest-
ments in the sector is that one simply had to have certain
skills, and thus training, to function properly in the
maritime world. As Falconer's Universal Dictionary of
the Marine (1784) explains, a sailor is a ‘person trained in
the exercise of fixing the machinery of a ship, and
managing her’ (our emphasis). Davis (1972: 117–18)
states that it took a ship's boy around two or three years to
become an ordinary sailor – it took even longer to become
an able bodied sailor. Some went even further, and
argued that not everyone could rise up the ranks. In a
parliamentary committee in December 1781, LordMulgrave, himself an experienced Navy officer, argued
for a focus on quality, and stressed the difficulty of finding
qualified sailors: ‘Seamen [were] not to be made in one, or
two, or three years; nay, many thousands of ordinary
seamen could never be made able seamen. […] it required
propensity, as well as understanding’ (Parliamentary
Register, 1782: 101–2).
There were roughly two ways in which a potential
seaman could acquire the required skills: through formal
education or by vocational training, i.e., by ‘learning on the
job’. In some countries, like England, the latter often
involved a quite rigid (and expensive) apprenticeship of
around three to five years. In the Netherlands, for instance,
such a formal framework was much less prevalent.
Nevertheless, as we have just seen, in all cases there was
a significant period of time involved to ‘learn the ropes’. In
fact, individuals could still be rated as a boy if the right
skills were lacking – regardless of age or stature (Dana,
1863: 160). The dataset shows that of the 198 interrogated
boys, 30 were 18 years or older. Indeed, training was
essential to acquire all the basic aspects of seamanship,
such as steering and basic navigation, and to get a wider
knowledge of the functioning of the ship's rigging and
sails. However, with technological advancements in
navigational instruments, some form of formal training
on land became necessary for most to really acquire skills
in navigation. It required ‘a thorough knowledge of those
matters which they have every day experimentally proved,
as well as theoretically incalculated’, as an article in the
British Press in 1811 put it (Public Journals, 1812: 50).
Indeed, although the practical use of instruments was still
best learned at sea, and in the eighteenth century there was
a marked rise in publications devoted to practical
navigation, the mathematics it involved could best be
mastered through schooling (Davis, 1972: 124–26). When
the boatswain Hans Michelsen Brenk was interrogated in
Newcastle in September 1794 he was asked, as was
customary, how long he had known the master. He
answered that they had known each other since they had
been ‘school fellows’.8
Even if much maritime training happened on board
ships at sea, some of the sailors had also received a more
formal education. But in the early modern period not many
schools provided specifically maritime education. In
London a navigation school was founded in 1673 (Davis,
1972: 124), followed by one in Copenhagen two years
later, specifically for the merchant marine (Feldbæk, 1997:
189). In England a few more mathematical schools
teaching would-be seamen were established at the
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124–25). Nevertheless, maritime schools proper were still
relatively rare in the eighteenth century, and were mainly a
feature of smaller seafaring communities in northwestern
Europe (and thus of relatively small scale) (Van Royen,
1987; Bruijn, 1997; Van Lottum and Poulsen, 2011). For
most aspiring seamen the best way to acquire advanced
mathematical skills was to take lessons from private
teachers who were often ex-captains or practical seamen
(Davis, 1972: 125).
Acquiring these additional skills was essential to those
hoping to reach the higher ranks, which leads us to a
second (though related) cause of the relatively high human
capital levels in the maritime sector: investment in one's
skills paid off. In the northwestern European labour market
of the eighteenth century, opportunities abounded for
working one's way up the career ladder if one put enough
into training. Although it was often a gradual process, it
was possible to advance from boy to chief mate on merit
(cf. Davis, 1972: 126). Van Royen (1987: 144) demon-
strated that in a span of ten years, no less than 61% of the
common sailors on boardDutchmerchant vessels had been
promoted to a higher rank. The ultimate step from mate to
captain was a much higher hurdle, and often depended on
factors beyond one's control; as the master was appointed
by the merchant, having sufficient social capital was as
essential as the human capital one possessed (Davis, 1972:
126–27).
Indeed, rising through the ranks, from boy to ordinary
sailor and so on, was possible and was certainly rewarding:
wages on board included substantial skill premiums.
Table 8 gives several examples of the wage structure of
ships from different countries, which indicates a remark-
able similarity among levels for the skill premium over
time and for various nationalities. When we set the mate's
wage at 100%, we can see that a sailor generally earned
slightly below half his wage. The wages of the boatswain
and carpenters were in between that of sailors and mates
(around 80% of a mate's), while cooks earned just slightly
more than an ordinary sailor. Finally, the boy (the lowestTable 8
Wage differentials aboard European merchant vessels.
Period Country Mate Boatswain
1 Netherlands 100% -
1 Sweden 100% 61%
2 France 100% 51%
2 Netherlands 100% 80%
2 Sweden 100% 80%
2 Germany 100% 67%
2 Spain 100% -
1 and 2 All 100% 68%rank on board) commonly received about half the wage of
a seaman, or about a quarter of that of a mate.
8. Conclusions
Crucial to the pre-industrial economy, international
shipping was a highly dynamic sector. Based on a dataset
comprising more than 2,500 ships, our estimates show that
labour productivity (measured in tons per man) increased
sharply during the eighteenth century. These efficiency
improvements can be found in all parts of Western Europe,
but our figures also show that the large gap in labour
productivity between the northern and the southern parts of
the continent remained unchanged: labour productivity
levels were much higher in the northwestern European
fleets than in their southern counterparts, confirming the
results of other studies on relative economic performance in
early modern Europe.
Our dataset also contains diverse information about
the maritime workforce of the eighteenth century,
which allowed us to calculate numeracy and literacy
levels for nearly 7,000 individuals. We show that
overall, human capital levels in the maritime sector
occupied a high level compared to other sectors of the
economy. That these levels were high indicates that
investment in human capital (either as a result of formal
education or on-the-job training) was relatively large.
This was true all around Europe. However, as with
labour productivity, there was also a north–south divide
in terms of human capital levels, especially towards the
end of the eighteenth century. Seamen on board the
ships of the northwestern European merchant fleets had
higher human capital levels than their colleagues in the
south. This is particularly the case with numeracy skills,
but literacy levels followed the same geographical
pattern. In the second period both indicators diverge
further in favour of the northern European fleet.
The analysis of the basic data as well as the regression
analysis showed the significance of human capital for
labour productivity. The most productive ships in ourCarpenter Cook Seaman Boy
- 55% 43% 30%
89% 61% 40% 20%
79% - 46% 23%
- 56% 48% 24%
73% 56% 45% 17%
53% - 50%
60% - 46% -
71% 57% 45% 23%
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numeracy and literacy. Those workers who invested in
their own human capital (indicated to us by the literacy and
numeracy proxies) were in fact the most skilled workers.
The quantitative analysis showed that at the country level
the two dimensions of human capital, numeracy and
literacy, had a positive and significant effect on labour
productivity. In most specifications of the regression,
productivity was also higher on ships co-owned by the
captain, but this effect was usually not significant. Workers
in the maritime sector are likely to have invested in skills
for two main reasons. First, the relatively sophisticated
technical environment made a certain skill level necessary,
and skilled workers would therefore have been in greater
demand when hired. Second, there was an incentive to
invest in skills because of an open market (in particular in
northern Europe) that allowed considerable vertical and
horizontal mobility. This latter feature, combined with
sizeable skill premiums, meant that there were monetary
returns to investments in training.
A question left unanswered here is why there are such
substantial differences in human capital levels between the
northern and southern fleets. If human capital was so
important for productivity in the maritime sector, why then
do we see such large geographical differences for both
indicators but, above all, no convergence over time? More
research is necessary to fully understand the (growing)
differences in skill levels between north and south. A
comparative analysis of investments in human capital in
this sector (i.e., in maritime schooling and training) may
shed light on this, in particular when the latter is linked
with differences in the adoption of various maritime
technologies. There is, however, an alternative institutional
explanation which merits attention. A key difference
between the northern and southern European fleets was
the level of internationalisation; northern European fleets
tended to sail with much more international crews than
those south of the Habsburg Netherlands (Van Lottum et
al., 2011). In France, for instance, it was relatively difficult
to hire seamen of foreign origin, because they had to prove
they were French residents, usually by showing a French
marriage certificate (le Goff 1997). Different restrictions
applied in Spain, where, until 1737, there was a quota on
foreign sailors. Even when these restrictions were lifted,
foreigners had tomeet various criteria before being allowed
to muster (Rahn Phillips 1997). Fleets without such
regulations (such as the German, Dutch, and Scandinavian
merchant fleets) could much more easily employ foreign
crews, and did so in very large numbers (Van Lottum,
2007). As a consequence, shipmasters from these countries
had a larger labour pool at their disposal, which made it
easier to select workers with the best skills (althoughsometimes at a premium). Even if, due to lack of
investments in seamen's education, for instance, ‘locally
sourced’ labourers lacked sufficient skill, a skipper could
turn to the international labour market and ‘import’ skilled
workers (thus making investing in one's skills all the more
important). Moreover, this flexible and in many ways
modern international labour market also facilitated (and
accelerated) the spread of knowledge and exchange of
ideas. After all, much of the maritime training (and
therefore knowledge exchange) took place on board a ship.
Compared to the fairly isolated and more sedentary labour
markets of the south, the relatively large number of labour
migrants aboard northern European vessels thus ensured a
much faster spread of state-of-the-art shipping knowledge,
both theoretical and practical.
Let us, however, conclude with the most important finding
of our paper: human capital really mattered for productivity
and performance in the shipping industry. This, we show, is
consistent with contemporary writings about the importance of
a skilled labour force on board the ships, and with increasing
investments by sailing communities into training and
education. The spillover effects caused by the evolution of
this industry were enormous. A highly productive shipping
sector enabled the Netherlands and, later, Great Britain to
dominate global markets. Nor would these nations have
been able, without such a high-performing shipping
industry, to develop into the ‘modern’ economies that
generated processes of long-term economic growth in this
period (De Vries and Van der Woude, 1997).
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A.1. Correlation matrixLnprod T Mastown Mastlit Numcrew Numall Litcrew Litall CrewlitshipLnprod 1.000
T 0.4472 1.000
Mastown 0.0766 −0.0011 1.000
Mastlit 0.1690 0.0857 −0.0271 1.000
Numcrew 0.4742 0.7413 −0.0066 0.1587 1.000
Numall 0.5208 0.7922 −0.0023 0.1818 0.9417 1.000
Litcrew 0.4597 0.3567 0.0745 0.1255 0.7805 0.6529 1.000
Litall 0.4510 0.5515 0.0137 0.1667 0.9370 0.8301 0.8961 1.000
Crewlitship 0.1543 0.2097 0.0104 0.0745 0.2635 0.2558 0.2240 0.2578 1.000A.2. Descriptive statistics of variablesVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxLnprod 2471 2.67732 .4436079 .5389965 3.84303
t 2575 .8217476 .3827994 0 1
Mastown 2532 .2819905 .4500576 0 1
Mastlit 2134 .9854733 .1196762 0 1
Numcrew 2389 .9355295 .0527162 .82 .97
Numall 2421 .9377654 .0569508 .76 1
Litcrew 2575 .6414835 .0967493 .42 .78
Litall 2575 .8376621 .0846363 .66 .91
Crewlit_ship 2303 .804183 .3114169 0 1References
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